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Abstract. I reply to seven objections to anthropomorphic theism: (1) Th at 
anthropomorphic theism is idolatrous. In reply I rely on the concept/conception 
distinction. (2) Th at faith requires certainty. In reply I argue that full belief may 
be based on probable inference. (3) Th at the truly infi nite is incomprehensible. 
In reply I distinguish two senses of knowing what you mean. (4) ‘You Kant 
say that!’ In reply I distinguish shallow from deep Kantianism. (5) ‘Shall Old 
Aquinas be forgot?’ In reply I discuss the simplicity of God. (6) What those 
garrulous mystics say about the ineff able. In reply I argue that mystics should be 
anthropomorphites. (7) Anti-theodicy. In reply I distinguish the community of 
all agents from the community of fi nite frail agents.
By anthropomorphic theism I do not mean the thesis that God has 
a humanoid body, but rather that either God as a whole or the Divine 
Persons taken individually are literally agents and literally have knowledge 
and power, and literally have a certain kind of character, being loving or 
in some other fashion morally good. In academic circles that conception 
of God is oft en dismissed as outmoded and naive. In this paper I consider 
and reply to seven objections to anthropomorphic theism.
My monsters are, in order of the increasingly bizarre, Th omists, 
Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion – e.g. Dewi Phillips (2005) and 
Andrew Gleeson (2010) – and Continental philosophers of religion – 
e.g. John Caputo (1997) and Nick Trakakis (2008). Philosophy is like 
a horror movie, or one of Descartes’ dreams. Once you form a clear and 
distinct idea of the monster it ceases to be frightening and becomes 
merely comical – a dyspeptic dinosaur or a grumpy octopus – and 
the only decision is whether to destroy or domesticate. It is the barely 
glimpsed and ever changing we-know-not-what that scares us. So for 
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any proposition whatever to attribute it to, say, Derrida, is to invite the 
criticism of having misunderstood. 
Here are the seven objections, with my replies. 
I. THAT ANTHROPOMORPHIC THEISM IS IDOLATROUS
Th e claim that anthropomorphic theism is idolatrous is, I suspect, 
based upon the mistaken position that God’s greatness is comparative, 
and so God is praised by a misplaced humility that exaggerates the gap 
between us and God. But that is just my suspicion. To defeat the charge 
of idolatry, I need to say something about diff ering conceptions of God 
and something about idolatry. 
For present purposes I take our concept (defi nition) of God as that 
which is worthy of worship, where to worship something is to have 
an attitude of unconditional trust and obedience. Because this is an 
evaluative concept we may make the concept/conception distinction 
(Gaillie 1956, Rawls 1971), keeping the verb ‘conceive of ’ as roughly 
synonymous with ‘describe,’ but without the connotation that description 
is contrasted with evaluation. Th e conception, on the other hand, is the 
worshipper’s conceiving of that in virtue of which the defi nition holds. 
Unlike a pure description it might itself be partly an evaluation, so long 
as it provides more detail than the defi nition itself. Th us a conception 
of God might include God’s moral goodness, or it might, instead, 
describe that in virtue of which God is morally good, say God’s being 
loving. Given that the concept of God is that which is (most) worthy 
of worship, the conception of God must, however, exclude beliefs that 
are not conducive to the worship. Th us someone could believe in divine 
simplicity without divine simplicity being part of the conception of God, 
because, the person believes, it is not part of that in virtue of which God 
is worthy of worship. 
Th ere may be some whose conception of God is of that which is not 
conceivable in positive terms.1 Call this the apophatic conception, and 
1 Th e positive/negative distinction for predicates is awkward. For some predicates 
might be neither, (e.g. ‘either x is not an agent or x is loving’) and some are hard to classify 
as positive, negative, or neither, notably ‘x is simple.’ For present purposes I characterise 
a predicate Fx as positive if either it is itself a natural kind term or for every natural kind 
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those who have it moderate apophats. More plausible is the position of 
the radical apophats, who deny the propriety of any conception of God. 
Th at is, although they may have various beliefs about God they deny 
that anything can be said about that in virtue of which God is worthy of 
worship – God just is worshipful, with nothing more to be said. Others 
of us – anthropomorphites – have a much more defi nite conception of 
God as a morally good agent of unlimited knowledge and power.2 
To worship God is to risk idolatry, namely worshipping something 
unworthy of worship, because either it is intrinsically not worth 
worshipping or because it is less worthy than something else. Now, 
worship takes an intentional object. Th at is ‘S worships X’ does not entail 
that X exists, or even that X is possible. So the phrase ‘something else’ is 
ambiguous. It could mean something actual, something possible but not 
actual, or even something impossible. (Note that because worship takes 
an intentional object I talk of God as an object of worship. Th is does not 
imply that God is an object in any other sense.) 
I now argue that we anthropomorphites need not be concerned 
with the claim that an impossibility is worthier of worship than the 
anthropomorphic God. I note, in passing, that those such as perhaps 
Caputo’s Derrida, or perhaps Caputo himself, who are said to worship 
something they believe impossible might be interpreted in various ways, 
for instance as worshipping that for which there are no conceivable 
grounds for Its possibility (Caputo 1997). Again, they might be 
worshipping something with contrary properties, for instance justice and 
mercy defi ned in such a way as to be inconsistent. Some dialethists such 
as Graham Priest hold that there are things that exist with contradictory 
properties, but these are actual and so possible (Priest 1996).3 
We should ignore impossible objects of worship because we should 
restrict the concept of idolatry to something that is reasonably prohibited. 
K, the Ks that are F is a natural sub-kind. A negative predicate is one whose negation is 
positive. Using this criterion, ‘x is simple’ is positive. 
2 Or, in my conception, an agent whose only limitations are freely chosen (Forrest 
2007). But this variation on unlimited knowledge and power need not here concern us.
3 In response to Priest, Derrida said ‘When I contradict myself I do not contradict 
myself.’ So presumably Derrida does not believe that ‘the other’ is an existing but 
impossible object. If he did he could scarcely call himself an atheist. I also note Bob 
Meyer who, as far as I know, genuinely believed in a God with inconsistent properties. 
I owe to him the example of God’s justice and mercy. 
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Alternatively, if you insist it is idolatry to worship a being than which 
something impossible is worthier of worship then we should distinguish 
between good and bad idolatry, where good idolatry is not reasonably 
prohibited and anthropomorphites may agree they are idolaters but of 
the good kind. 
Th ere are two reasons why it is not reasonable to prohibit what 
I shall now call pseudo-idolatry, namely the ‘idolatry’ of worshipping 
something less worthy than an impossible object. Th e fi rst is that non-
idolatry (and hence the destruction of idols) is not an end in itself, but 
a means to the end of proper worship. Now, I say it is unreasonable to 
require ignorance of its object as a condition for worship.4 Hence the 
prohibition of pseudo-idolatry is reasonable only if it is reasonable to 
worship the impossible knowing it to be so. But although many people 
have worshipped the impossible, to worship something is to worship It 
as existing, so it is incoherent to worship something you believe to be 
impossible. 
Th e second reason for ignoring pseudo-idolatry is that we can 
explain why idolatry is prohibited. For worship is unconditional trust 
and obedience. Now conditional trust etc. is trust etc. that would be 
withheld if circumstances were diff erent. And when we compare the 
actual with a hypothetical situation we always assume the hypothetical is 
possible, unless it is explicitly stated to be impossible.5 Hence the most 
that unconditional trust etc. requires is that there be no possibility of 
something more worthy of worship. Hence pseudo-idolatry is not bad 
idolatry. 
I concede, however, that the properly worshipful must not just 
be that than which none worthier of worship exists but must be that 
than which none worthier of worship is possible.6 Moderate apophats 
might be interpreted as accusing anthropomorphites of idolatry on the 
grounds that the apophatic conception is of a greater being than the 
4 Worship involves trust, and willingness to trust even when it is risky is a virtue. So 
too much knowledge of the object of worship confl icts with the exercise of a virtue. But 
that does not show that ignorance is required for worship.
5 For example, ‘I believe time travel to be impossible because if it were possible then 
the time traveller would be fated to behave in a certain way’. 
6 Unless epistemic possibility is explicitly being considered, possibility is always 
interpreted as metaphysical possibility in this paper. 
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latter. Th ey may join radical apophats in accusing anthropomorphites of 
idolatry on the grounds that nothing we can conceive of would be worth 
worshipping, even if nothing worthier were possible. Initially I shall 
interpret the continental philosopher of religion John Caputo (1995) as 
making this accusation, with which Nick Trakakis (2008) sympathizes. 
As a preliminary, I say that the fear of a moderate risk of idolatry 
should not make us refrain from worship. Th at would be an instance of 
tutiorism, the unwillingness to risk performing a sinful act, even for an 
excellent reason. We should reject tutiorism because of its capacity to 
interfere with love of self, of neighbor and of God. In particular, we should 
take a moderate risk of idolatry for the sake of worshipping God. 
A reasonable fear of idolatry will, therefore, give careful consideration 
to various conceptions of God, to see which, if any, result in idolatry. 
I accuse moderate apophats of idolatry because their conception does 
not mention that God is good in the moral sense, and we should give 
unconditional trust and obedience only to the morally good. In this 
connection I note but regret the human tendency to consider the 
mysterious worshipful. 
Moderate apophats might respond in one of two ways. One is to assert 
that God is morally good in a way we cannot conceive of. Th is coheres 
poorly with the revelation that God is loving, because being loving is 
a way of being morally good we can conceive of. In any case, this response 
is incompatible with the apophatic conception, which is that there is no 
further detail to be given when conceiving of that in virtue of which 
God is worthy of worship other than God’s inconceivability. To say we 
can go one step further before we cease to be able to conceive is to reject 
the apophatic conception. Th e other moderate apophatic response is to 
deny that God is morally good but instead to say that moral goodness 
is predicated by analogy of God.7 I shall discuss analogy below– here it 
suffi  ces to challenge the apophat to explain just how we can truly apply 
the predicate ‘morally good’ by analogy without us being therefore able 
to conceive of God as ‘analogically morally good.’ 
Far from the moderate apophat having a more worship-worthy 
conception of God than the anthropomorphite there are reasons, then, 
7 If Wolterstorff  (2010) is right in his interpretation of Aquinas theory of analogy, 
Aquinas asserts that God is morally good even though goodness is predicated by 
analogy. 
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why the God of the moderate apophats might be unworthy of worship 
even if there was no better. Maybe, though, this is to condemn a straw 
apophat, because actual ones are all radical. Coming closer, I suspect, 
to the positions of Phillips (2005) and Caputo (1997), I argue against 
apophats that the anthropomorphite conception is the best we have. 
For, I say, there is nothing possible we humans can conceive of that is 
more splendid than a morally good agent, whether human or divine. 
And if we add that this agent is unlimited in power and knowledge then 
it is a proper object of unconditional trust, love and obedience, and is 
that than which nothing worthier of worship can be conceived. Perhaps 
apophats will complain that it is possible there is something greater than 
anything we can conceive of. I agree that it is epistemically possible 
– we do not know that it is not the case. But to refuse to worship the 
anthropomorphic God because we do not know there is no greater is 
the tutiorism I have rejected – a bit like not having sexual relations with 
someone who was adopted as a child, because you are not certain the 
person is not your half-sibling. Th ere is, however, no reason whatever 
to believe in the metaphysical (as opposed to epistemic) possibility of 
something worthier of worship than the anthropomorphic God. How 
could we, unless we can form a defi nite conception? 
I draw the provisional conclusion that unlike the apophatic conception 
the anthropomorphic is not genuinely threatened with being idolatrous. 
Th ere is more, though, to the accusation of idolatry. For my provisional 
interpretation of that accusation by Continental philosophers of religion 
is not the only one. It is also plausible that anthropomorphites, and 
analytic philosophers generally, are accused of worshipping a mere 
construct in place of God. Here I have a problem: I know what I mean by 
the word ‘construct’ but I suspect those who use that word freely do not. 
I shall now explain what I mean in order to show that an unlimited agent 
is not a construct in this sense. 
I follow Meinongians to the limited extent of granting that the 
quantifi er ‘some’ does not have an existential implication. So some things 
exist and some things don’t. Th ere are some predicates X, notably ‘exists’ 
itself, such that the proposition that some Y is X entails that there exists 
a Y. Call these existential predicates. I assume that there is a recognisable 
class of mental attitude predicates, none of which are existential. I take it, 
then, that we recognise as standard the use in which atheists grant that 
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theists worship something even though, they say, we worship something 
that does not exist. 
By a construct I mean something of which a mental attitude predicate 
holds essentially. Now the word ‘essential’ derives from a precise enough 
piece of medieval philosophical jargon, but it has come to have several 
meanings. For present purposes the relevant sense is that the mental 
attitude predicate is part of the conception of God. For example, 
if you had a conception of God as actually worshipped then God 
would be a construct. If we are going to treat constructs as idols then 
this characterisation of a construct should be refi ned so as to exclude 
disjunctive, conditional and negative predicates, and so as to treat every 
mental attitude predicate as a disjunction of the refl exive and non-
refl exive case. For instance, something does not have to be possible to 
be inconceivable; for oft en we assume that inconceivable things such as 
(Euclidean) square circles cannot exist. But because ‘inconceivable’ is 
negative the inconceivable God is not a construct. Nor is Its worship in 
itself idolatrous. What is idolatrous is the entailed omission of divine 
goodness. 
It is worth checking that paradigmatic social constructions do turn 
out to be constructs as defi ned. A coin for instance consists of an object, 
typically a metal disc, of which the predicate ‘widely believed to have 
a designated monetary value’ is part of our concept. Th at predicate is 
non-existential because it could be the case that the half-cent coin is 
widely believed to have a designated monetary value even though there 
never were any such coins. 
Another paradigm of a construct is a promise. A promise is not 
just a form of words but a form of words conventionally understood as 
binding. Th e property of being conventionally understood as binding 
could well hold of some famous but mythical historical promise.
If it were part of our conception of God that It is that than which no 
greater is conceived of by us, then this God would a construct, because 
we can conceive of things that do not exist. And I grant that worshipping 
a construct is idolatry because it is absurd to put unconditional trust and 
obedience in something that depends on us. 
What these examples show is that genuine fear of idolatry should 
motivate an exercise in analytic philosophy, namely investigating which 
conceptions of God imply, in perhaps subtle ways that God depends on 
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us. Th e conception of God as an agent without any limitations to power 
and knowledge is not a construct and worshipping such a God is not 
idolatrous, unless there is some possible thing worthier of worship, 
which I have denied.
 
II. THAT FAITH REQUIRES CERTAINTY
Although explanatory power is not part of the anthropomorphic conception 
of God many have that conception because, they say, anthropomorphic 
theism provides the best ultimate explanation of things.8
Th is makes theism a metaphysical hypothesis set up as a rival to 
naturalism, and makes theism the content of a ‘reasonable faith.’ Th ere is, 
the objection continues, no way in which the belief that something is the 
best hypothesis is compatible with the sort of passionate commitment 
that is faith (Phillips 1995, ch 1). Suppose that the argument for the 
anthropomorphic God has some precise probability, say 75%. It is then 
unwarranted to have anything other than a degree of credence equal to 
that probability, namely 75%. Th is illustrates the dilemma that, in the 
absence of strict proof of God’s existence, we must either settle for a degree 
of credence less than full belief, or adopt a passionate commitment to 
a God who is experienced in our lives. Th e former is judged inadequate; 
the latter is subjective in the sense that it is arrived at by each individual 
for him or herself. 
First I note the Protestant background of this complaint, based as it is 
on the supposed importance of the individual’s act of faith.9 Next, I note 
the curious asceticism of those who want to make their faith diffi  cult. But 
even given that background we may respond by denying the wisdom of 
proportioning belief to the evidence, and with Newman (1903) granting 
that it is warranted to have full belief (‘assent’) in that which, considered 
8 My own preferred speculation is slightly diff erent. I speculate that the ultimate 
explanation is an unlimited agency without any character. It would be idolatrous to 
worship this God. But, I speculate, It becomes loving and hence worshipful. 
9 I take Kierkegaard as an especially articulate and self-aware proponent of this sort 
of critique of reasonable faith, especially when it concerned the Incarnation. Th e criticism 
being considered is no longer specifi cally Protestant, because of the individualistic 
character of ‘Western’ culture. 
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as a hypothesis, is supported only by a probable inference. Th is response 
may be made more technical by denying that there is a precise probability 
for the case for anthropomorphic theism. We may then follow Kyburg in 
treating precise probabilities as a fi rst approximation only, with a better 
one obtained by measuring probabilities as intervals, as it might be 75% 
± K% for some K (Kyburg 1974). To be sure, the precision in the value of 
K is still somewhat counterintuitive but Kyburg’s theory of probabilities 
is a step in the direction of plausibility. Suppose, for instance, that the 
case for the anthropomorphic God has probability 75% ± 25%, that is, 
the interval from 50% to 100%. Th en rationality does not specify any 
degree of belief in that range. 10 Hence a passionate commitment could 
result in full belief. 11 
III. THAT THE TRULY INFINITE IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE
Some might reject anthropomorphic theism on the grounds that I claim 
to know what I am talking about, contrary to the tradition of caution in 
talking about God. In a sense of course I claim to know what I am talking 
about, but there is also a sense in which I make no such claim.
Sometimes when we speak we feel confi dent that we know what 
we mean. Th is typically happens when we can clearly imagine what it 
would be like for what we say to be true, and what it would be like for 
what we say to be false. Th ere are many ways, however, in which we can 
talk truthfully of something without this confi dence. In those cases we 
might well say we do not know what we are talking about. One source 
of examples of this is mathematics. I fi nd it interesting that spheres of 
diff erent dimensions have quite diff erent characteristics. But I cannot 
imagine hyper-spheres nor can I follow most of the proofs. Another 
source of examples is provided by the layperson’s use of natural kind 
terms. Someone might say a lot of accurate things about Uranium 235 
10 In the absence of any emotion we might well tend to have degrees of belief near 
the middle of the range, say within 10% of 75%. But to insist on this is to go beyond the 
argument, which is here assumed to have a probability measured as an interval of 50% 
width not one of 20%. 
11 For a recent discussion of the conditions under which passional belief is warranted, 
see Bishop (2007). 
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and Uranium 238 without understanding even that their nuclei have 
diff erent number of neutrons. But an example that I think may be more 
relevant to talking about God is that of a red/green colour-blind person, 
who can distinguish yellow from blue and asserts that red and green are 
colours. Th e colour-blind person can speak about colours and has an 
imaginative grasp of the yellow/blue contrast, but no imaginative grasp 
of the red/green contrast. 
Now consider the assertion that the Primordial God is an agent, but 
one without any limitations. Opponents of my anthropomorphic theism 
may be supposing that I feel the same confi dence about knowing what 
I am talking about when I say God is an agent as when I say I am an agent 
but deny that Christmas trees are. I do not. 
Our capacity to talk about things without knowing what we are 
talking about should be taken as a datum for philosophy of language not 
a controversial thesis. Hence it supports those theories of reference that 
explain this datum. Th us on the Putnam-Kripke causal theory of reference 
we can apply a natural kind term by referring to the kind, without any 
knowledge of the kind such as a scientist has (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1973; 
see also Bird and Tobin 2010). But in many cases we can pick out a kind, as 
the most natural kind exemplifi ed by the paradigms and not exemplifi ed 
by a contrasting group of anti-paradigms. It’s like a treaty between two 
nineteenth century European countries dividing up some part of Africa, 
when neither party was familiar with either the region or the people they 
were impacting on. For instance, a river unexplored by Europeans is the 
agreed boundary and one power has the right to any islands in this river, 
even though neither power is sure there are any. 
To say more requires both philosophy of language and metaphysics, 
both of which are controversial. Here is a sketch, based on the theory 
that perception is a relation to a universal, which is instantiated if 
the perception is veridical (Forrest 2005). Readers may substitute 
their preferred theory. To imagine is to stand in a certain relation to 
a universal that need not have been perceived but must be related to 
ones that have been using some short list of relations – relations that we 
also comprehend.12 I shall use the term ‘comprehend’ in a narrow sense, 
12 Th e least controversial of which is conjunction. Th ese may well be innate in that no 
experience is required of these relations. 
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according to which we comprehend what we are able to imagine. Using 
either language or some pre-linguistic way of thinking, we can think 
about the universals we comprehend as well as ones that we do not.13 
Th e latter (which perhaps need not exist) are formed in ways that do not 
enable us to imagine. For instance, we comprehend causation and we 
comprehend coming into existence, so we can talk meaningfully about 
a cause of all that comes into existence, but without comprehension. 
Anthropomorphites, then, should not be accused of claiming to 
comprehend God, merely to be able to describe God as an agent of 
unlimited power. 
IV. ‘YOU KANT SAY THAT!’
I have never met anyone who is prepared to defend the arguments that 
Kant actually relies on in (either edition of) the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Nonetheless it is widely supposed that Kant has undermined both 
metaphysics and natural theology. I suspect this is a case of ‘Non! Je ne 
regrette rien.’14 It takes courage to study a diffi  cult author only to declare 
it a waste of time. 
In this situation I challenge would-be defenders of Kant to state 
arguments against anthropomorphic theism that they are prepared to 
defend from objections. In addition I consider what it would be like to be 
persuaded by Kant and so I distinguish shallow from deep Kantianism.
By shallow Kantianism I mean a certain way of putting scare quotes 
around ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth,’ to mean what we naturally but, it is 
said, mistakenly tend to call knowledge and truth, respectively. By deep 
Kantianism I mean a theory of truth as a triadic relation between truth-
bearers, truth-makers (‘things in themselves’) and truth-mediators, where 
the last are dependent on our nature as human beings. Deep Kantians say 
that truth is relative to truth-mediators in a way that anti-Kantians would 
consider benighted. Th us, suppose that the best way of understanding 
13 Maybe thinking about is identity in this case. Th at is, the referring expression in 
the language of thought is the universal it is about. (I follow Richard Sylvan in using the 
phrase ‘is about’ rather than ‘refers to’ because it is widely assumed that we cannot refer 
to what does not exist.)
14 Continental philosophers might like to take Edith Piaf ’s song as their anthem. 
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things is a theory that entails the existence of an X or some Xs (Xs might 
be electrons, say, or, more pertinently the anthropomorphic God). Th en 
the natural tendency is to believe that there exists an X, relying on an 
inference to the best explanation. And we may be explicit and say that 
the natural tendency is to say both that we know there exists an X and 
that ‘Th ere exists an X’ is true. As an anti-Kantian, I agree, apart from 
some scruples about calling belief knowledge when sane intelligent 
people disagree with me. Shallow Kantians, however, are sceptics and 
deny the capacity of our natural belief-forming tendencies to arrive at 
truth on such theoretical topics. Shallow Kantians might, like Vaihinger 
with his philosophy of ‘als ob,’ live their lives as if there are Xs, and expect 
it to remain as if there are Xs (1968). Th is is much the same as ‘accepting’ 
that there are Xs in van Fraassen’s sense of accepting a theory while 
suspending judgement as to its truth (1980). 
Th ere are several reasons for rejecting shallow Kantianism. Th e fi rst is 
that if applied universally it is self-limiting. For it then requires suspense 
of judgement about shallow Kantianism itself. Th e second is that the case 
for shallow Kantianism concerning anthropomorphic theism is weaker 
than that concerning the theoretical entities of science. For consider Larry 
Laudan’s pessimistic induction: most scientifi c theories have been shown 
false so current ones are more likely than not also false (Laudan 1981). 
We may say that, for instance, Newton’s theory of gravity is false but it is 
mostly as if it is correct. Th e nearest thing to a pessimistic induction in 
theology is that over the millennia the number of gods believed in has 
declined to one and the next step is zero. You might as well argue that 
because microscopes have been invented that enable us to see smaller 
and smaller things we will soon be able to see things of zero diameter. 
Th e third, and I think, most serious problem with the application of 
shallow Kantianism to anthropomorphic theism concerns its extension 
to other religious beliefs notably the future self-revelation by God. I call 
this the eschatological objection. On the assumption that it is as if there 
is an anthropomorphic God then the future divine self-revelation will 
be as if the anthropomorphic God is revealed. But that is, according to 
shallow Kantians, concealment not revelation. 
Deep Kantians agree with anti-Kantians that we should believe 
in accordance with our natural tendencies, but – as a result of the 
systematic application of these tendencies, they say – truth isn’t what 
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we ‘naively’ thought.15 In that case we should believe anthropomorphic 
theism to be true, although not ‘naively’ true, and hence that there exists 
an anthropomorphic God. 
Th e only diffi  culty I envisage given deep Kantianism is a renewed 
charge of idolatry on the grounds that the anthropomorphic God is less 
worthy of worship than an unknowable God-in-Itself. My response is 
that worship is an attitude of unconditional trust and obedience, and 
that these attitudes are just as much to things-as-they-are-related-to–us 
as are beliefs. It is not as if we are to change epistemic gear when it comes 
to religion. Nothing more is required of beliefs than truth, no matter 
what truth turns out to be.
 
V. ‘SHALL OLD AQUINAS BE FORGOT?’
Th ere was a dispute between those such as Duns Scotus who held that 
we are able to say some positive things of God and of human beings 
in a straightforwardly univocal fashion and others, such as Th omas 
Aquinas, who held that words such as ‘good’ applied by analogy to God 
and to humans. Th is was largely because Aquinas held a strong doctrine 
of divine simplicity according to which the divine attributes are all 
identical to God. 
First I shall rebut the thesis that predicates such as ‘has causal power,’ 
‘has knowledge’ and ‘is morally good’ apply analogically to God. Th en 
I shall undermine the reasons for proposing that thesis.
If we apply analogy in Aristotle’s ‘pros hen’ sense to talking about 
such a God then we might say that God has causal power, knowledge and 
goodness in the sense that human causal power, human knowledge, and 
human goodness are signs of God, just as urine is called (un)healthy if it 
15 I am supposing a broadly Reidian epistemology based upon trust in the ways of 
reasoning we tend to use prior to critical refl ection. Th is trust may be defeated using 
other natural ways of reasoning. Th e outcome of this process of self-correction cannot 
be determined by over-arching principles because these principles would themselves be 
the products of such reasoning. I am conceding that someone might arrive at a Kantian 
position as a result of this process of self-correction. I suspect, however, that Kantianism 
results instead from excessive concern with knowledge. 
118 PETER FORREST
is a sign of (poor) health. (Aquinas uses this example as well as Aristotle, 
apparently endorsing a sign account of analogy.)16 
To apply predicate X by analogy to b in this sense might but should 
not be understood minimally as saying that b brings about Xs. For that 
would permit any number of silly analogies in the human case: the 
clapper is by analogy the clap, and so on. Moreover, if we do understand 
analogy in this minimal fashion it also follows that God is by analogy 
bad as well as good. For some intrinsically bad things, such as moderate 
suff ering, seem to be part of the divine plan and so are caused by God. 
And that is not the intention of those who tell us that predicates apply 
to God by analogy. Now it is tempting to respond that God creates with 
moderate suff ering as part of the design plan, but it is for a good purpose. 
I agree but that it is to go beyond the minimal account of analogy. 
As its rather complex history shows, the theory of analogy asserts 
more than that God causes various eff ects. Given the current use of the 
word ‘analogy’ it is no surprise that resemblance may be used in the 
analysis of analogy. Th is can occur in one of two ways. We might say 
that the eff ects of God are like the eff ects of an agent of a certain kind. Or 
we might say that God Itself is like an agent of a certain kind. Th e fi rst 
amounts to saying it is as if there is an anthropomorphic God, and so 
turns into shallow Kantianism restricted to God. To go where scholars 
fear to tread, I speculate that Kant came to say of everything what he 
already as a Lutheran pietist said of God, or even that Kantianism is what 
you get when you cross pantheism with pietism. I have already explained 
why I reject shallow Kantianism and the eschatological objection holds 
against the as if anthropomorphic theory.
Analogy in its current ordinary sense would have it that God 
resembles the anthropomorphic God. Th is is interesting because it raises 
the question of whether overall resemblance is unanalysable or, as I claim, 
it holds in virtue of respects of resemblance. In the latter case, predicates 
corresponding to those respects are predicated univocally of God and 
human beings. To treat resemblance as unanalysable is a Wittgensteinian 
thesis. Th e chief reason for rejecting it is that (1) we do distinguish 
respects of resemblance and (2) overall resemblance may be analysed 
in terms of a combination of respects of resemblance and pragmatic 
16 For a discussion of medieval theories of analogy see (Ashworth 2009.)
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considerations, but attempts to analyse respects of resemblance in terms 
of overall resemblance and pragmatic considerations fail.
Let us now consider the motivation for analogical predication, from 
the strong thesis of divine simplicity. I submit the case for divine simplicity 
is only a case for the weaker thesis that the fi rst cause has no parts. 
If God has parts, as it might be if the three Divine Persons are 
themselves gods, then, it is said, God depends on the parts and so is ‘ab 
aliud,’ contrary to being the fi rst cause. Again if God has parts then, it 
might be said, some of these parts could exist without the others, so God 
would not be a necessary being, as is required for a fi rst cause. Neither of 
these arguments is beyond criticism, but that is not my present concern, 
which is the application of them to properties. If properties are treated as 
particulars, as in the unhappily named ‘trope’ theory of D. C. Williams 
(1953) then they are indeed parts of the things that have them. And 
Aquinas’s position may well be a ‘trope’ theory. But if you are a realist 
about universals, like Duns Scotus, or a nominalist, like William of 
Ockham, there is no reason to assimilate properties to parts. Nonetheless 
there is a genuine problem here. Th ere is no necessary connection 
between moral goodness on the one hand and power and knowledge on 
the other. So to hypothesise that unlimited power and knowledge entails 
goodness is an extravagant hypothesis, unlike the plausible hypothesis 
that unlimited power requires unlimited knowledge. I have argued 
elsewhere that goodness is applied to the fi rst cause in an analogical sense 
only, but that God acquires literal goodness. Putting that to one side I see 
no reason why the fi rst cause should not be an agent of unlimited power 
and knowledge. 
VI. WHAT THOSE GARRULOUS MYSTICS SAY 
ABOUT THE INEFFABLE
I ask the mystic who claims to have experienced (being one with?) God 
the question, ‘What make you think it was God?’ It is not possible to 
experience lack of all limitations. How can we tell the diff erence between 
a god (angel) with power over this universe and a God with power over 
all universes? Th e mystic runs a more serious risk of idolatry than the 
anthropomorphite. 
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To have any assurance that what is experienced is indeed divine the 
mystic requires a conception of God instead of being the sort of apophat 
who rejects any such conception. I have already argued against the 
apophatic conception. I conclude that only by being anthropomorphites 
may mystics reasonably say that what they experience is so much more 
than merely having a true description of God. 
VII. ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND ANTI-THEODICY17
By anti-theodicy I mean the position that theodicy (‘justifying God’s ways 
to Man’), whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious 
enterprise (see Trakakis 2008). As I understand it, anti-theodicy is based 
on the accusation that the theodicist assumes that God is part of our 
moral community, and that given this piece of anthropomorphism it 
is both absurd and off ensive to off er the usual theodicies such as the 
free will defence.18 My response is that there is more than one moral 
community: there is the community of all agents, to which God belongs, 
and there is a community of frail, cognitively limited, agents, to which 
God does not belong. Relative to the fi rst community we should, albeit 
cautiously, stand in judgment on God, whom I fi nd innocent. Relative to 
the second community it would be blasphemous to do so.
Th e anthropomorphic God is an agent, as we are, but unlike us in 
not being limited in knowledge. Our limitations in this regard explain 
why for human beings the ends do not always justify the means. For 
human beings to act so as to maximize expected utility given their beliefs 
about the future is for them ‘to play God’. Th e anti-theodicist is in eff ect 
accusing the anthropomorphic God of playing God. 
17 See (Forrest 2010) for a more detailed criticism of anti-theodicy.
18 In analytic philosophy of religion it is common to follow Plantinga and distinguish 
a defence from a theodicy, the former being merely intended to establish the consistency 
of a good God creating a universe with many and grievous evils. Th e distinction is not 
important here. 
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CONCLUSION
Th e current intellectual disdain for anthropomorphic theism is, I have 
argued, without any basis. It strikes me as ‘sour grapes’: prematurely 
despairing of the reasonableness of anthropomorphic theism, the 
intellectual pretends that this is a crude conception of the divine. 
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